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In this lecture, I’m going to explain how and why I came to write my  article,  The Law of 
Economic Subordination and Resistance.1   I hope that by doing so, I will be able to 
shed some light not only on my own field of labour law,  but on the larger problem of 
how legal fields or domains of legal knowledge, come into existence, change  or 
become obsolete, and  in the end are either transformed or superseded altogether.  I 
will be talking about labour law, but I hope you will be thinking about transnational law.  
I’m going to try to persuade you that the invention and transformation of these two fields 
have something in common.  But I’m going to go further.  I hope to convince you that 
their ultimate fate is determined by some of the very same forces.  Transnational law, I 
am going to argue, can only survive if it learns from the short,  sad history of labour law.    
So to begin at the beginning: I am a labour lawyer. For much of my early career, I tried 
conscientiously not only to show how the present law fails to produce logical, just and 
workable outcomes, but also to propose new legal arrangements that would be in 
everyone’s interests. Most of my colleagues were doing the same thing, though of 
course we didn’t always agree on either our critique or our proposals for reform.  But we 
had some good ideas, we tried hard to persuade people to adopt them, and sometimes 
we even succeeded.  But gradually it became obvious that even our best ideas, even 
ideas that judges and legislators adopted and translated into law,  did not necessarily 
make the world a better place for workers.  Nor did the adoption of new international 
and constitutional protections for workers.   Nor did the election to office of labour-
friendly political parties.   
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Admittedly, I may have been a slow learner.   It took me some time.  However,  in the 
end, I came to accept that law lacks the capacity to fundamentally alter power relations.  
Those relations are ultimately determined not by law but by political economy, and they 
are found not in the law reports or statute books but embedded in cultural practices and 
social structures.   No “silver bullet” with “law” written on it, I came to feel, would 
fundamentally alter labour markets or relations of employment. Law’s contribution would 
be very much at the margins.  Workers would only get the rights they were prepared to 
struggle for.    
Well, they struggled — and they lost. The labour movement is almost everywhere in 
retreat. Union membership, power and influence are all declining rapidly — in some 
countries, they are near the vanishing point. Labour and social democratic parties are 
able to remain “credible” only if they abandon their historic values, alliances and 
programs. The welfare state has been fatally weakened by forty years of ascendant 
neo-liberalism, and more recently by the force majeure of austerity. Labour market 
institutions and regulatory agencies are in disarray — often understaffed and 
disempowered. Workers’ share of GDP is diminishing; wages have lagged inflation; 
some combination of precarious employment, underemployment and unemployment 
afflicts almost all advanced economies. The result, as we all know, is that these 
economies are growing more and more unequal, and the problems of economic 
subordination are growing more severe.   
How can we explain these developments? Globalization, technology and market 
fundamentalism are the most obvious causes. However, one more cause occurred to 
me, which I explored in an essay entitled Labour Law after Labour?2  I suggested that 
labour is no more. It is no longer a sociological descriptor: workers now tend to self-
identify as members of the middle class rather than the working class, as consumers 
rather than producers; they mobilize politically around issues of race, religion, national 
identity or lifestyle, not the defence of their class interests; and working class culture 
has been absorbed into a commercialized, popular culture. Worse yet, labour is no 
longer a matter of urgent public concern.  So far as I know,  hardly any newspaper in 
the United Kingdom or North America has a labour specialist.  In many jurisdictions, 
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labour is no longer a free-standing  field of public policy: many governments have 
assigned the functions of their labour departments to ministries of welfare or economics;  
decisions made by Finance and Trade and Industry departments turn out to be far more 
consequential for workers’ wellbeing than anything that happens in whatever ministry 
now has formal responsibility for employment standards or collective bargaining.  And to 
my great distress, Labour is no longer a popular academic subject: in business schools, 
courses in labour  or industrial relations have given way to courses in human resource 
management; in many law schools, labour law is either not taught, taught by 
practitioners rather than tenured scholars, or disaggregated into specialist regulatory 
fields such as pension law or discrimination law.  
And now a question it pains me to ask:  What is the future for a legal field called labour 
law in which the law is designed to protect people who no longer think of themselves as 
“labour” and in which the very concept of “labour” is disappearing from public, political 
and academic discourse? And the answer pains me even more: it is not  a bright future.   
I will return to this theme, the theme of my article Labour Law after Labour, in a 
moment. But first I want to point to two great anomalies in the present situation.  First,  
the disappearance of labour and the decline of labour law’s importance coincide with a 
period during which, in many advanced economies, labour has acquired more formal 
legal rights than it ever enjoyed before. In my own country, Canada, for example, the 
courts have decided that labour’s rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike 
and picket are all protected by the constitution.   And parallel developments have taken 
place in the space governed by transnational law where the regulation of labour rights 
has expanded enormously.    Now the second anomaly:  during this same period, while 
labour’s social, economic and political influence have been deteriorating, labour law 
scholarship has been flourishing.  It has become more theoretically and 
methodologically sophisticated and diverse; it has begun to address law at every level 
from the indigenous law of the workplace to national systems of labour market 
regulation to the domain of transnational labour and social rights; and it has belatedly 
begun to explore the problems of previously neglected worker cohorts such as migrant 
workers, domestic workers and those engaged in non-waged work. Perhaps these two 
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anomalies lend credibility to my thesis that struggle, not law, ultimately defines the rights 
that  workers actually enjoy.  
In any event, I am sure you will understand why I have been feeling recently that my 
intellectual life’s savings, almost entirely invested in labour law, are very much at risk. 
“How did this happen?”, I asked myself. “Am I the victim of historical trends, rather than 
poor personal judgment?” In order to answer this question, I decided to revisit the 
history of labour law: when and why did it emerge, when and why did it flourish, when 
and why did it decline? Some answers to these questions are found in The Law of 
Economic Subordination and Resistance. I will summarize them very quickly.  
Labour law began as an academic discipline and field of professional legal practice in 
the 1920s — a response to the social upheavals of the late 19th century, to the Great 
War and the Russian Revolution and to widespread outbreaks of proletarian discontent. 
It took on special urgency during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and really came 
into its own during the period between 1945 and 1960 when unions gained power and 
legitimacy as part of what is known as the postwar settlement. By about 1960, even 
conservative law faculties, law publishers and lawyers’ organizations were prepared to 
acknowledge labour law as a legitimate field of legal learning and practice. However,  in 
the 1970s, the postwar settlement began to unravel.  Over the next four decades, as I 
have mentioned, globalization, technology, market fundamentalism and the 
disappearance of working class identity and solidarity have combined to launch unions 
on a long-term downward trajectory from which they may never recover. With the 
decline in unions has come a decline in labour’s political and economic power, and that 
decline in turn has undermined labour law. After all, who is interested in advocating, 
designing, administering, studying or practising a field of law whose output is likely to be 
frustration and disappointment?  
So, labour law has had a fairly short life, in historical terms, as well as a mostly unhappy 
one. But wait! Could things have turned out differently? Better for workers? Better for 
society? Better for labour lawyers like me? This is the point in my article at which I 
introduce my thought experiment, my historical counter-factual.   A counter-factual is 
something that might plausibly have happened, but didn’t. Suppose, I conjecture, that 
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instead of inventing a legal regime that had only to do with labour, we had created 
something more ambitious — a field of law that was concerned not just with 
employment but with all forms of economic subordination. As I point out, conceivably 
this might have happened during the 1930s, when a wide variety of people — workers, 
small businesses, farmers, consumers, investors — were all recognized to be suffering 
as a result of  a crisis of unregulated capitalism and inept governance. America came 
close to responding to their plight by adopting the NIRA, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1935 —one  version of my  law of economic subordination and 
resistance.  Other countries, including Canada,  might have followed if the American 
experiment had succeeded. But the NIRA was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court; 
some parts of it were reintroduced in piecemeal fashion, including what came to be 
known as the National Labor Relations Act; and the Great Depression gave way to 
preparations for war, the war itself and postwar reconstruction. My counterfactual never 
happened.  
But could it happen today? Is the crisis of capitalism comparable to that of the 1930s? 
And might a new legal field called “the law of economic subordination and resistance” 
have something to contribute to the resolution of that crisis? Let’s pursue those 
questions and see where they take us.  
The last question first. In my article I stress the conceptual incoherence of labour law, 
which consists in most common law countries of bits and pieces of private and public 
law, of general law and special statutes, which express very different value 
assumptions, and use different conceptual vocabularies, but which are deemed to be 
core elements of labour law because they happen to address the same phenomenon: 
the employment relation. But if that is the criterion for inclusion in the domain of labour 
law, why not many other things that seldom find their way onto the labour law curriculum 
or the dockets of labour law practitioners: why not trade law and immigration law that 
significantly influence the balance of power in the labour market? Why not tax or 
corporate law that  establish the dynamic of business decisions that in turn lead to the 
hiring or firing of thousands of workers? Why not the laws that govern technical training 
and retirement security, social housing and health care, that at one remove but with 
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great power, help to determine what social goods will be provided by the employer, 
what by the state and what by workers themselves?  
So, labour law is incoherent. Would the law of economic subordination and resistance 
be any less so? The unifying theme of my counterfactual is that gross disparities of 
economic power are inherent in capitalism, and that certain generic legal technologies 
can and should be used to reduce those disparities or to mitigate their harmful effects. 
The aggregation of countervailing power is one such technology; the requirement that 
all economic bargains should be fair and transparent is another; state imposition of 
minimum or standard terms is another; the displacement of private market provision of 
social goods by public provision is another; and the list goes on. My suggestion, then, is 
that experts in the technologies of resistance might be able to show tenant groups what 
they can learn from labour unions, to show the owners of small business franchises 
what they can learn from farmers, and to show mortgagors what they can learn from 
consumers. The end point of the exercise is by no means revolutionary. It is merely to 
save capitalism from its own excesses, which are very much in evidence today. 
If pressed, I would have to admit that the law of economic subordination and resistance 
is likely to be no more coherent than labour law. Indeed, by ignoring the very different 
social and economic contexts in which subordination and resistance occur, it might turn 
out to be even less coherent.  Nonetheless, it has  both conceptual and practical 
attractions.  
Conceptual attractions first:   The likely incoherence of  my imagined  law of economic 
subordination and resistance is  not a mere oversight on my part, an accidental failure 
to integrate diverse  legal and regulatory systems.  Rather,  it is deliberately  
constructed as the mirror image of our present  incoherent  legal system which  has 
been unable to perceive — let alone link, analyze or respond to — many important real-
world social, economic and political developments.  Although these developments are 
clearly related  in both their origins and their consequences, they are currently assigned 
to separate intellectual domains on the basis of a system of legal and regulatory 
taxonomy constructed at another moment  in history, and with a different set of value 
assumptions.    Thus, the problems of consumers are characterized as “contract law”, of 
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tenants as “property law”, of debtors as “insolvency law”, and of workers as “labour law” 
or “employment law”.  Similarly,  the decision-making processes by which their fate is 
determined are variously assigned to the domains of  “constitutional law” or 
“administrative law”,  “corporations”  or “securities law”.    
However, such labels fail to capture the underlying  structural pathologies of 
contemporary capitalism whose manifestations they represent.  By contrast,  descriptors 
such as those  I have proposed — “subordination” and “resistance” —  or others such 
as “precarity” or “exclusion”, call our attention to what these problems have in common: 
they all  arise from decades of domestic and transnational  market fetishism.  
Admittedly, my alternative descriptors — subordination and resistance, precarity and 
exclusion — are provocative:  but no more so than the terms that have been deployed  
to ease us gradually into the post-affluent,  post-social democratic era that is our “new 
normal”.   I have in mind such reassuring  terminology as “smart” or “responsive” 
regulation,  “best practices” and “new public management” which are designed to make 
us feel good about  deregulation and the retreat of the state from its responsibilities to 
protect citizens from malfunctioning markets and malevolent corporations.  Or I might 
mention “flexibilisation”, “responsibilisation” and “contractualisation”.  Such terms  are 
used to make it appear that recent labour market  and welfare “reforms” are not only 
inevitable but logical and desirable.  Who could possibly be against flexibility, against 
responsibility, against freely made contracts?  Who indeed — except those who 
experience declining living standards and the resulting degradation of their civic and 
cultural life.   My point, in short, is that conceptual language can render visible or 
invisible, controversial or conventional, the developments they  purport to describe.   
There is also, despite its incoherence, a distinctly practical dimension to a legal field that 
answer to the name of  the law of economic subordination and resistance.  First, it 
would be a response to the argument that labour law is nothing more than an attempt to 
claim for workers privileges that  are unavailable to other groups in society. Why, for 
example, should workers enjoy access to special tribunals with expedited procedures 
and enhanced remedial powers, when consumer and tenancy disputes must be dealt 
with through the slow, clumsy, expensive and often ineffective procedures of the regular 
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courts?  The answer to such  questions is the core notion of the law of economic 
subordination and resistance:  all subordinate people should enjoy access to similar 
means of resistance.  Second — a related point — if other groups such as farmers and 
small businesses could realistically aspire to the social gains won by workers in the 
heyday of collective bargaining and the welfare state, might they not be less hostile to 
unions than they now are?  And third — perhaps too much to hope for — might not a 
broad coalition of social forces emerge from the shared sense of workers and other 
subordinate groups that they have a common interest in finding ways to resist their 
subordination, or at least to strike a better balance between their interests and those of 
powerful corporations?   
That’s how legal fields emerge, take hold or decline.  Which brings me finally to the 
business of this Summer Institute.  I’ll try to explain what transnational law has to do 
with labour law other than it being another legal field in transition.   
One connection is that both fields have been influenced by legal pluralism — by the 
notion that the state has no monopoly on the making of law or its implementation.  I 
developed this notion in  Labour Law Without the State,3 one of my first attempts to 
describe transnational labour law.  In that article,  I pointed out that  labour law had 
never been state-centred; it had always included an important element of informal and 
indigenous law making.  But as I had to acknowledge in a later article,  Landscape and 
Memory,4  although  labour law was an example of legal pluralism,  it was nonetheless 
shaped by political economy which profoundly influences power relations in labour 
markets and workplaces, as it does in so many other contexts.   
My next attempt to describe transnational labour law was in a piece called 
Extraterritoriality by Other Means.5  Here I focussed on  the practical mechanisms by 
which globalization constructs its own normative systems.  My  sub-title — How Labor 
Law Sneaks Across Borders, Conquers Minds and Controls Workplaces Abroad — 
pretty much tells the story.   And finally, in a recent piece — Making Bricks Without 
Straw: The Creation of a Transnational Labour Regime6 — I try to bring together the 
various lines of my work. Is it possible, I ask, that my counter-factual thought experiment 
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— the law of economic subordination and resistance — might help us to think of new 
ways to protect workers’ interests in the context of globalization?  
Globalization has played a leading role in the destruction not only of national labour law 
systems but also of other regimes whose ambition is to restore a measure of fairness to 
relations characterized by  severe inequalities of economic power. We must therefore 
learn how to  achieve social justice in the workplaces of what looks like being a 
permanently globalized world. However, we have been handicapped in pursuing this 
project by the absence of a big idea, of a plausible alternative vision of economic 
relations. Perhaps, I speculated,  maintaining our traditional focus on labour has 
contributed to this difficulty.   Labour lawyers generally insist that  their subject is a 
unique, a distinct, legal field.  They often make their point by reminding us of the moral 
implications of the fact that “labour is not a commodity”.   However, as I point out in  
Bricks without Straw,  this justification for labour law “[valorizes] class membership or 
the employment relation” — both of which are concepts with a diminishing grip on 
reality.  Fortunately, there is another way of looking at labour law.  As I suggest:   
The … narrative … of employment can be understood as a specific instance of 
injustice that reinforces the case for adherence to a general principle: everyone is 
entitled to freedom, dignity and a decent life; everyone should be treated with 
fairness and compassion. The ultimate value … is social justice, not identity…. 
In effect, I  was offering a new ethical justification for the new legal field that I was 
proposing, a field built around all relations of economic subordination and all 
technologies of resistance.  
Coincidentally, this formulation also opened up a new possibility to expand the spatial 
reach of labour law. Today most markets operate across national boundaries and 
require some form of transnational regulation. However, while a framework of 
transnational law is emerging to regulate capital and commercial markets, the regulation 
of labour markets has lagged badly. Worse yet, the absence of effective universal 
labour standards has enabled regulatory competition amongst states that are willing to 
attract investors by ensuring the subordination of their own workers. If workers’ rights 
and interests were to be inscribed along with those of other subordinate groups on a 
comprehensive agenda of developmental and trade concerns — rather than as a 
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separate and unique project called “labour law” — they might gain the same 
international visibility and transnational support that attaches to, say, environmental or 
health or consumer protection issues.  
To do this, or course, requires a robust response to the discourse of global  “thought 
leaders” who seek to “normalize” existing relations of subordination by demonstrating 
that they are not only inevitable but morally defensible. I propose two related examples. 
According to orthodox economists, Greek pensioners deserve to suffer significant 
reductions in their standard of living because they have tolerated a political system 
characterized by corruption, tax evasion, and financial irresponsibility. Likewise, 
Canadian workers deserve to see their jobs shipped to Mexico or China because 
collective bargaining and the tax burdens of the welfare state have led to unsustainably 
high labour costs in the manufacturing sector.  In this fashion, the discourses of market 
fundamentalism and global neo-liberalism legitimate a system of transnational 
governance in which the interests of subaltern groups — both labour and non-labour — 
receive little attention and less sympathy. Collective challenges to this way of thinking 
are a necessary first step towards alternative models of capitalism and of global 
governance.  
Which brings me —  at last — to the prospects of transnational law as an instrument for 
social justice. Let us assume, as the literature suggests, that there already exists in 
embryo a body of transnational law governing labour and social rights, human rights 
more generally and even, as Boa Santos proposes, a jus humanitatis. Let us suppose 
as well, contrary to the facts, that the widely-recognized regime of lex mercatoria has 
begun to incorporate principles that ensure basic fairness for the subordinate party in 
contractual dealings to— debtors, consumers, franchisees and so on. Let us imagine, in 
other words, that my counterfactual was instead factual, and that the law of economic 
subordination and resistance has already emerged in the interstices of transnational 
law. What would that mean?  
I have to be careful here. It would not mean nothing.  In given circumstances this new 
body of law could be used to embarrass corporate wrongdoers, educate public opinion, 
and elicit remedial action from governments that now and again want to do the right 
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thing. But that’s the problem. Unfortunately the history of labour law tells us under what 
“given circumstances” this new branch of law would likely be effective. When labour lost 
its power, labour law became a lost cause; and until other economically subordinate 
communities regain  the power that labour has lost, my thought experiment will not 
succeed. There will never be a transnational law of economic subordination and 
resistance, to speak plainly, unless and until social movements have the power to do 
economic harm to corporations and political harm to governments. International 
conventions and covenants, universally recognized social rights, corporate best 
practices and codes of conduct, principles of contract and soft law regimes: none of 
these will matter much unless people who do not now have power are somehow able to 
mobilize effectively and on a broad front.  
This will not be easy. The labour movement is clearly disempowered; most other 
subordinate groups are unwilling to mobilize or, if they do, to stay mobilized for a 
sustained period of time.  Further,  many such groups mistrust each other; and that 
mistrust prevents the formation of broad coalitions.  And finally,  the complexity of global 
markets largely hides corporations and governments from scrutiny and shields them 
from pressure. In short, the same circumstances that have led to existing imbalances of 
wealth and power across the global economy and in national economies, are also 
preventing the emergence of new legal technologies of resistance.  
I admit, then, that prospects for rescuing my intellectual investment through a turn to 
transnational law seem poor.   Why then should we bother with thought experiments like 
the law of economic subordination and resistance? Why should we trouble ourselves 
about the emergence or non-emergence of a regime of transnational law? One strong 
proponent of transnational law answers these questions in the following way. The 
conceptualization of transnational law as a new legal field (he says)  
… might help both juristic practice and socio-legal scholarship by making it 
possible to organize, link and compare what often appear as very disparate and 
problematic, but increasingly significant, types of regulation.  
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The same might be said for the law of economic subordination and resistance. And then 
he makes an even more important claim: 
The attempt to clarify the nature of transnational law … forces a fundamental 
reconsideration of relationships between the public and the private, between law 
and state, and between different sources of law and legal authority. 7  
I agree with those claims, and I will add another, yet more compelling, reason why we 
should do thought experiments. Their great virtue is that they remind us of the tenuous 
connection between legal representations of social relations, and their reality. Concern, 
even outrage, about that divergence, I should add, is what has caused the current 
explosion of excellent labour law scholarship, as many scholars suggest ways to 
rescue, revise or replace existing, obsolete or failed approaches to the field.  But alas, 
much of that scholarship (mine not least) is unlikely to produce practical real-world 
consequences.  
Will transnational law suffer the same fate as labour law? Will it come to be regarded as 
another thought experiment that was intellectually provocative, but did not achieve its 
ambitious objectives of bringing the rule of law and the regime of justice to a globalized 
world?  
As you will perhaps  conclude from your own research and the discussions this week, 
the definition of transnational law is contested. For some scholars, it includes all of the 
normative regimes that govern relationships or transactions across state boundaries, 
including but not limited to those that emanate from state law or from agencies 
empowered by treaties or conventions entered into by states.  For others, transnational 
law is a pluralistic legal system, constructed from the bottom up, by transnational actors 
including corporations,  sectoral business associations, technical bodies, financial 
institutions, agencies for dispute settlement, social movements, trade unions and 
communities.8  For others still, transnational law offers, above all, a critical perspective 
on the role of legal regulation in a world that is deeply divided economically and 
politically. Whatever the definition, one thing is clear: conventional descriptions of law 
that begin and end with the state are no longer accurate, if they ever were; in our search 
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for greater accuracy we must somehow take account of the multiple normative systems 
that now govern the transnational movement of goods, capital, people, culture, 
technique, information and ideas. I am going to refer to those systems as “transnational 
law” without worrying too much about what is included and what is not in order to make 
my final point.  
It is this:  We can admire the ingenuity and the energy of those who have built 
transnational law, whether they set out to do so or not; we can admire the intellectual 
acuity of those who have noted its existence and theorized about it in such a stimulating 
fashion. But what we cannot do is to romanticize transnational law. Transnational law is 
very much like national law, only more so. It shares the strengths of national law, but 
also its weaknesses. It is often inaccessible to those who need it most.  Like national 
law, when it is invoked, it is often ineffective.  Like national law, it reflects and frequently 
reinforces existing power relations but is far less often successful in revising them.  
How then do we establish a just and effective regime of transnational law? Just as we 
do with national law: by broad-based political and social mobilization, by winning the 
intellectual and cultural battle for people’s hearts and minds, by organizing and 
demanding and pressuring for reform of the economic order that the law is meant to 
govern. In other words: by making the law of economic subordination and resistance a 
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